The Senate voted overwhelmingly that Iraqi forces should assume the lead in the war in 2006 so that the United States could begin a phased withdrawal.

In Cairo, the Iraqi factions meeting under Arab League auspices actually agreed on something: They urged the United States to announce a timetable for withdrawal.

Now, our nation needs to agree on a withdrawal strategy. Four elements define a departure plan:

• How we characterize the end of our combat-force presence.

• When the departure starts.

• When it ends.

• What our residual involvement will be.

First, the strategy must be characterized by emphasizing our achievements. Those American families that have borne the burden of wounded and dead loved ones should know what has been accomplished.

Even if we still disagree about whether it was worth the costs, the war has brought Saddam Hussein to justice for crimes against humanity; has removed any possibility of an Iraqi military threat in the region, including with weapons of mass destruction; and has given Iraqis a chance to create a non-totalitarian government, hold elections and adopt a constitution enshrining human rights.

Initiate withdrawal

Second, the initiation of U.S. combat-force departure should be linked to one of those accomplishments. It should start in January, a month after the elections of the new parliament. Initiating withdrawal will not increase the ferocity of the insurgency. Those fighting against us are not holding back now. Initiating the withdrawal will, however, signal to the non-insurgent Iraqis that they must act now without U.S. forces as a crutch, overcome factional disputes, achieve political compromise and evict foreign fighters.

Third, on the end date, we should announce that we anticipate the final withdrawal of U.S. combat forces will occur sometime in 2007; precisely when will depend on how events unfold. Such a formula provides the Bush administration flexibility, while sending the message that the end of the U.S. occupation is in sight and we are leaving on our own timetable.

That might stimulate the Arab League and its members to increase efforts to stabilize Iraq. It would be a mistake, however, to tie our withdrawal to the achievement of some specific capability by a precise number of new Iraqi army battalions. The United States' interests cannot be indefinitely tethered to the competence of Iraqi military recruits, many of whom seem resistant to training.

Deflate insurgency

Some say that if we "cut and run" (which apparently means leaving Iraq sooner than whatever date the administration eventually comes up with), there will be chaos in Iraq. There already is. Much of the chaos is because we are there, our forces seen as occupiers and serving as a lightning rod for both foreign fighters and Iraqi nationalists. When we depart, much of the wind will leave the sails of the insurgency because the foreign occupation will be over.

Could there be more chaos when the last U.S. combat unit departs? Possibly, briefly, but Iraq will not be an orderly place when we leave, whether that is 2007 or 2010.

Delaying a possible spike in chaos in three years does not outweigh the benefits of withdrawing sooner. Staying there beyond 2007 would come with high costs in American lives, and in Iraqi lives taken by U.S. forces. It would not be worth the further damage to America's diminished standing in the world that accompanies our occupation, nor the price we pay by generating more terrorists motivated by our presence in Iraq.

Fourth, we should say now of our residual involvement that we will remain actively engaged diplomatically and in other ways in Iraq. Our military training will continue, as will our reconstruction assistance. If a terrorist sanctuary were to develop in Anbar province or elsewhere, we would reserve the right to act in our own security interests, as we would do anywhere in the world. We will continue a robust Army and Air Force presence in nearby Kuwait. If the integrity of Iraq were thrown into question in a way that threatened regional stability, we would consult with other concerned nations and act appropriately.

Such an Iraq strategy might gain a consensus in the USA because it makes clear that we do not have an open-ended commitment of U.S. combat forces and that we do have realistic expectations about what the United States' interests are in Iraq. Those interests would be best served if we start to leave soon and do so over 12 to 18 months, as part of a coherent strategy.

Richard A. Clarke was a White House national security official for the past three presidents. His new book, The Scorpion's Gate, is a geopolitical thriller.